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Abstract. Many safety-critical industries are moving away from compliance-based 
safety measures and looking for solutions incorporating adaptability and resilience. 
However, there are significant challenges when considering applying such measures to 
construction. The unique design of projects prevents the development of transferable 
experience, and the use of subcontracting limits opportunities for long-term investment 
in workers. This paper contrasts the traits of resilient organisations with the 
characteristics of the construction industry. It is proposed that construction could 
become more resilient by incorporating employee-level – as opposed organisation-level 
– aspects of the ‘Adaptive’ age of safety. Further research is needed to understand how 
the psychological factors believed to underpin a resilient response to risk can be 
developed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2014/15 thirty-five occupational fatalities occurred in construction making 
construction workers nearly four times more likely to be killed in an accident at work 
compared to the average across all sectors (HSE, 2015). There is a pressing need to 
change attitudes within this sector that safety management is a “bureaucratic burden” 
that detracts from production and that risk is an inherent part of their work (Swuste, et 
al., 2012, p.1333). The emerging “Adaptive” age (Borys, et al. 2009) offers new 
approaches to safety management with the potential to challenge this; however, safety 
management research has become increasingly focussed on ultra-safe high-risk sectors 
which are vulnerable to rare but catastrophic accidents (such as plane crashes and 
explosions) and neglected hazardous work like construction. Hence, when translating 
these novel measures into an industry like construction – which sees frequent, 
individual casualties – significant clashes arise.  
This growing disconnect between traditional occupational health and safety (OSH) and 
the emerging fields of resilience engineering and safety-II mean the latest developments 
in risk management are unsuitable for contexts where the need for innovation is 
greatest. Safety-critical sectors are seeing important changes in the way safety is 
managed, moving towards a less calculative approach that no longer depends upon 
identifying and eliminating a ‘root cause’. The past 10 years have seen a growing 
emphasis on resilience and how this can be developed within organisations: People are 
no longer seen as a threat to reliability that needs to be controlled, but as the source of 
flexibility which is needed to overcome unexpected and adverse circumstances 
(Hollnagel, 2008). The enlightened approach of these organisations recognises that rigid 
procedures can prime inappropriate responses; unrealistic targets such as “zero 
accidents” breed scepticism and prevent incident reporting; and risk aversion stifles 
creativity and learning.  
Construction is a particularly unique industry characterised by its heterogeneous 
network of subcontractors: Employment is fragmented, projects unique, plans dynamic, 
and finances constrained (Lingard and Rawlinson, 2005), and as such it is difficult to 
develop and invest in a long-term risk management strategy like permanent 
organisations are able to. This paper contrasts the traits of resilient organisations with 
the characteristics of the construction industry with a view to defining the barriers and 
identifying a way forward so construction can benefit from adaptive safety.  
 
2. Method  
 
A literature review was conducted exploring conventional risk management and injury 
prevention in the built environment disciplines, and comparing this with constructs from 
the adaptive age including high reliability organising (HRO), resilience engineering, 
safety-II, and a generative safety culture.  
 
3. Findings 
 
The findings will be discussed with reference to five characteristics of organisations 
which are managing safety in accordance with the adaptive age – continuously learning, 
well-resourced, flexible, chronically uneasy, and humanising – each of which poses 
specific problems for the construction industry.  
 
3.1 Continuously Learning 
Learning from experience and feedback allows a resilient organisation to anticipate and 
prepare for unexpected events; however, construction is an industry particularly 
vulnerable to economic pressure: Employment fluctuates with recession and growth, 
hence the sector operates as a dynamic network of projects subcontracted to multiple 
organisations, allowing firms to employ specialists on a flexible per-task basis and cope 
with changing market demands. As a result, construction projects become fragmented 
into units with a silo mentality – conflicting interests, ambiguous authority, inadequate 
communication, and reduced teamwork (Manu et al., 2013). This is a very different 
picture to the empowered, multi-disciplinary, and constantly interacting teams which 
enable high reliability organisations to build up a complete risk picture (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2007).  
This transient structure impacts both workers’ loyalty to the client and management’s 
commitment to workers’ professional development. While resilient organisations see the 
value of investing in training and drills to develop a wide range of employee experience 
and shared knowledge within the system, this long-term outlook is not prioritised for 
temporary employees of construction projects. Furthermore, the unique design of 
projects prevents knowledge transfer between projects and the specialised nature of the 
construction trades prevents multi-skilling, therefore limiting workers’ awareness of 
risks outside their own role. 
 
3.2 Well-resourced 
Another feature of safety-critical organisations which contributes to their resilience is 
that safety is prioritised and therefore invested in. The ability to respond to unexpected 
events without sacrificing performance relies on building up resources, both in terms of 
knowledge and physical assets. These can take the form of preparations, procedures, 
and competence to manage known threats, or a contingency of uncommitted resources 
(“pockets of resilience” Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007, p.80) to tackle unknown threats.  
Unfortunately, the structure and economic constraints of the construction sector make it 
difficult to prioritise safety by investing in resources in this way. Although the notion of 
uncommitted resources is attractive, in a temporary and financially pressured 
environment it is unlikely. It is known that for safety management to be most effective it 
needs to be incorporated into the project at the design phase; however, projects are often 
awarded to the lowest bidder and clients focus on the end service or infrastructure 
without considering the implications of how this will be achieved. Production is 
prioritised over safety; efficient decisions (as opposed to mindful) are encouraged, and 
in order to cope in this dynamic industry workers are forced to take shortcuts and 
workaround issues to meet production targets. 
 
3.3 Flexible 
Ironically, construction workers and projects are adaptable, but their inability to cope 
with change without it resulting in incidents means they cannot be described as 
“resilient”. OSH is far more difficult to implement in organic organisations – those 
which respond rapidly to changing market conditions (Burns and Stalker, 1961) – than 
mechanistic because autonomy, independence, and the use of initiative to overcome 
problems are encouraged (Lingard and Rowlinson, 2005). Instead, it is the inflexible 
timescales and regulations which put pressure on workers to take risks.  
Proceduralisation and compliance-based risk management are widespread in 
construction. Tasks are seen as routine and therefore they can be proceduralised, 
however each project is unique and so procedures, particularly if they are rigidly 
adhered to, can have a negative impact on workers’ awareness and flexibility: 
Procedures can create a form of ‘tunnel vision’ known as inattentional or perceptual 
blindness and can prime the wrong responses, reducing sensitivity to cues outside their 
expectations.  
The difficulties of managing a dynamic project also means site-wide regulations, such 
as “no hard hat no work”, are implemented in situations where hard hats and other 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) are unneccesary or even a hinderance. Rather than 
empowering workers to deal with risk, this inflexible approach to work practices shows 
a lack of sensitivity to operations and breeds cynicism among the workforce. Although 
this risk averse strategy protects against litigation, conventional approaches to OSH, 
including highly prescriptive procedures and legislation, limit innovation and 
professional judgment, hindering people’s ability to assess and manage risk 
appropriately and the development of “entrepreneurialism…resilience and self-
reliance” (Gill, 2007, p.18) – the types of thinking needed to adapt in response to 
unexpected events.  
 
3.4 Chronically Uneasy 
Fruhen et al. (2013) categorised the sensitivity and suspicion within managers of high 
reliability organisations as comprising of “pessimism, propensity to worry, vigilance, 
requisite imagination and flexible thinking” (p.969). Developing a culture of chronic 
concern about safety issues is a fundamental part of resilience: Maintaining the potential 
for failure at the forefront of their mind-set fights the complacency and automatic 
processing which allow errors surface. In contrast, construction is known for its ‘macho 
culture’: Physically demanding tasks undertaken in all weather conditions attract a 
workforce stereotypically seen as young, agile, males with low academic attainment, 
who therefore lack the vulnerability that motivates a vigilant and proactive attitude to 
risk. Their inability to resolve “distancing through differencing” (Cook and Woods, 
2006) – also described as the ‘it would never happen to us’ attitude – makes it 
particularly difficult for these workers to learn from the mistakes of colleagues and 
other organisations. 
Imagination is another trait which seems incongruous with construction work. Requisite 
imagination (Adamski and Westrum, 2003) or the “the fine art of anticipating what 
might go wrong” (p.193) has been identified as a component of chronic unease: 
Imagination can support an adaptive approach to safety by enabling those involved to 
anticipate more potential scenarios and capture the failures that fall outside the 
expected. It also encourages a questioning attitude and helps to prevent distancing 
through differencing by allowing workers to imagine themselves in an accident scenario 
and digest its consequences (Kreiner, 2009).   
 
3.5 Humanising 
Managing risk in a humanising (as opposed to ‘dehumanising’) way can be subdivded  
into two aspects: Firstly, an approach to risk management which engages with workers 
and empowers them, and secondly an approach to investigating accidents which 
appreciates their complex causes and avoids hasty judgements of workers’ 
incompetence or negligence. 
As discussed in Section 3.1 organisational resilience relies on feedback, enabling the 
workforce to collectively learn from experience; this requires a just culture to support 
reporting of accidents. On the other hand, in construction there is a strong tendency 
towards explaining accidents with a root cause model. Pragmatic ‘Zero Accident’ style 
behavioural safety programmes have becoming increasingly popular in spite of their 
superficial understanding of psychology which promotes a simple reward-punishment 
paradigm as a means to control unsafe behaviour. Rather than promoting a culture of 
trust and motivating learning, the unachievable goal of zero accidents breeds scepticism 
of OSH and reduces reporting for fear of punishment. Innovation and flexibility have 
also been shown to decrease, and rewarding successes (such as the number of hours 
since the last accident) worryingly promotes complacency (Long, 2012). Similar rigid 
and centrally-determined targets – which are often skewed towards those which are 
easier to measure such as behaviour instead of culture, accidents instead of resilience – 
lack the sensitivity to operations needed to allow workers’ the autonomy and 
responsibility to manage their own risks. 
Zero accident programmes also demonstrate a superficial understanding of accident 
aetiology which causes blame to be placed on worker behaviour rather than systemic 
issues. In contrast, a view of accidents has been proposed from the adaptive age which 
opposes a causal-pathways altogether and instead sees accidents as an unfortunate and 
unpredictable combination of sacrificing decisions, the consequences of which resonate 
throughout the system in a way that far exceeds the sum of the errors (Hollnagel, 2009). 
Instead of seeing humans as inherently dangerous, and therefore firing those 
‘responsible’ for accidents, this view challenges this approach and opens up 
opportunities to discuss and learn from accidents by avoiding blaming individuals. A 
humanising approach, which sees people as part of the solution, is critical to managing 
safety adaptively.   
   
4. A Way Forward 
The adaptive age of safety offers a move away from bureaucracy and a means to 
manage safety without sacrificing performance – both of which are needed to change 
the cynical attitude towards safety management within construction – yet opportunities 
to incorporate adaptive safety in this sector have been neglected. By viewing the 
components of adaptive safety in light of the characteristics of the construction industry 
the incompatible organisational characteristics which have prevented progress are 
highlighted; however, adaptive safety relies on the principle that people are resilient and 
innovative, so focussing on the employee aspects of adaptive safety offers the potential 
to circumvent the challenges posed by its complex structure. 
Many of the challenges discussed have their roots in the fragmented and financially-
constrained nature of this project-based sector, rather than its employees. In reality, 
construction workers are adaptable, demonstrated by their ability to work around 
problems, but at present the pressures on this sector channel this capacity towards 
productivity rather than safety. An employee-centred, bottom-up approach to cultivating 
resilience by developing requisite imagination and chronic unease could help to increase 
vigilance and promote proactivity in the face of risk. Further work to understand these 
mechanisms – which have been proposed as antecedents to a resilient response to risk – 
presents a valuable opportunity to improve safety in construction and enable hazardous 
industries, as well as high risk, to employ aspects of an adaptive approach to safety.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The disparities between construction OSH and the and adaptive safety have been 
explored: The project-based nature and transient workforce prevent continuous learning; 
temporary employment limits investment in diversifying workers’ skills and experience; 
financial constraints do not allow for contingencies; rigid procedures hinder initiative 
and flexibility; the macho culture fights feelings of vulnerability; and a pragmatic 
approach to finding the root cause of accidents has created a culture of blame and 
intolerance. Applying principles advocated by the adaptive age such as management 
commitment, sensitivity to the frontline, prioritisation of safety, empowerment of 
employees, and a just culture presents a significant challenge. Instead, it is proposed that 
construction could become more resilient by incorporating employee-level – as opposed 
organisation-level – aspects of the adaptive age of safety. For this, further research is 
needed to understand how the psychological factors believed to underpin a resilient 
response to risk (chronic unease and imagination) can be developed. 
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